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inequalities in the delivery of clinical care in a
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analysis
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Background: Socioeconomic deprivation is associated with inequalities in health care and outcomes. Despite
concerns that the Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme in the UK would exacerbate
inequalities in primary care delivery, gaps closed over time. Local schemes were promoted as a means of improving
clinical engagement by addressing local health priorities. We evaluated equity in achievement of target indicators
and practice income for one local scheme.
Methods: We undertook a longitudinal survey over four years of routinely recorded clinical data for all 83 primary
care practices. Sixteen indicators were developed that covered five local clinical and public health priorities: weight
management; alcohol consumption; learning disabilities; osteoporosis; and chlamydia screening. Clinical indicators
were logit transformed from a percentage achievement scale and modelled allowing for clustering of repeated
measures within practices. This enabled our study of target achievements over time with respect to deprivation.
Practice income was also explored.
Results: Higher practice deprivation was associated with poorer performance for five indicators: alcohol use
registration (OR 0.97; 95 % confidence interval 0.96,0.99); recorded chlamydia test result (OR 0.97; 0.94,0.99);
osteoporosis registration (OR 0.98; 0.97,0.99); registration of repeat prednisolone prescription (OR 0.98; 0.96,0.99); and
prednisolone registration with record of dual energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) scan/referral (OR 0.92; 0.86,0.97);
practices in deprived areas performed better for one indicator (registration of osteoporotic fragility fracture (OR 1.26;
1.04,1.51). The deprivation-achievement gap widened for one indicator (registered females aged 65–74 with a fracture
referred for a DEXA scan; OR 0.97; 0.95,0.99). Two other indicators indicated a similar trend over two years before being
withdrawn (registration of fragility fracture and over-75 s with a fragility fracture assessed and treated for osteoporosis
risk). For one indicator the deprivation-achievement gap reduced over time (repeat prednisolone prescription (OR 1.01;
1.01,1.01). Larger practices and those serving more affluent areas earned more income per patient than smaller practices
and those serving more deprived areas (t = −3.99; p =0.0001).
Conclusions: Any gaps in achievement between practices were modest but mostly sustained or widened over the
duration of the scheme. Given that financial rewards may not reflect the amount of work undertaken by practices
serving more deprived patients, future pay-for-performance schemes also need to address fairness of rewards in relation
to workload.
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There are widely recognised inequalities in the delivery
of primary care, often associated with socioeconomic
deprivation [1, 2]. The UK Government made tackling
health inequalities an explicit health service priority with
the specific aim of improving life expectancy in areas
with the worst health and deprivation [3, 4]. The UK
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) represents the
most substantial initiative within primary care to im-
prove quality and eliminate unacceptable variations in
healthcare [5]. It is based upon the premise that financial
incentives attached to quality indicators can improve
practice and reduce inequalities in healthcare provision.
Other healthcare systems have adopted or considered
similar initiatives [6–12].
Evidence on the effectiveness of pay-for-performance
in primary care is mixed at best [13–15], and is associ-
ated with a range of unintended consequences, such as
encouraging a ‘tick box’ culture [16], undermining pro-
fessional autonomy and internal motivation [17], and
causing conflict between members of practice staff
[18]. In addition, there are concerns that such schemes
exacerbated inequalities in the delivery of care; prac-
tices serving deprived populations achieved lower
levels of performance [19], received less generous fi-
nancial rewards [20], and potentially inappropriately
excluded more patients than those serving more affluent
populations [21].
Longitudinal analyses suggest that there were initially
gaps in achievement between practices in deprived and
affluent areas, but that these closed over time. Doran et al.
examined the relationship between socioeconomic in-
equalities and overall achievement for 48 of the national
Quality and Outcomes Framework clinical indicators
during the first three years of the scheme’s implementa-
tion [22]. National achievement rates increased over the
period, and the gap in median achievement narrowed
from 4.0 % to 0.8 % between practices in the most and
least deprived areas. Ashworth et al. analysed data for
blood pressure monitoring and control indicators over the
same period, finding that the gaps in achievement rates
between practices in affluent and deprived areas had
almost closed by the third year of the scheme [23]. A
systematic review of largely observational studies concluded
there was weak evidence that pay-for-performance reduced
inequalities in chronic disease management between
socioeconomic groups [24].
The UK Department of Health funded the establishment
of a number of locally devolved pay-for-performance
schemes in 2008. These offered potential advantages over
a national scheme, such as allowing the setting and reward
of more ambitious targets than those set nationally,
providing opportunities to pilot and improve new quality
indicators, and better targeting incentives to reflect localhealth needs [25–27]. Furthermore, professionals are often
reluctant to engage in national quality improvement initia-
tives because of perceived ineffectiveness or even harm, as
well as failures to take account of local contexts [25]. The
negotiation of targets with local health professionals may
enhance ownership and commitment and strengthen a
focus on tackling inequalities [25–27]. These potential
gains need to be considered against possible drawbacks,
such as increased inequalities in delivery of care if prac-
tices in affluent areas can reach targets more easily than
those in deprived areas.
The former NHS Primary Care Trust (PCT), NHS
Bradford and Airedale, was provided with £3 million
funding to develop one such scheme, with a particular
emphasis on addressing inequalities in health and the
delivery of health care. We examined whether this local
pay-for-performance scheme reduced gaps in achieve-
ment of targets between the general practices serving
the least and most socioeconomically deprived popula-
tions. Our accompanying qualitative evaluation explores
whether it also avoided unintended consequences [28].
Methods
Study design and setting
We undertook a retrospective longitudinal survey of
clinical data routinely recorded over four years for the
local pay-for-performance scheme. The scheme was in-
troduced in 2007 and ran until 2011, there was no pre-
intervention data period. Bradford is the twenty-sixth
most deprived out of 326 local authority districts in the
UK, with high levels of morbidity [29]. Twenty per cent
of its 518,000 people are of South Asian origin as de-
fined by the census [30]. It was not possible to analyse
the effect of ethnicity in this study given the unreliability
of data coded in primary care.
All 83 practices participated in the evaluation, repre-
senting a total population of 555,879 patients. The
mean practice IMD for Bradford and Airedale of 37.93
(range 5.6 to 62.3) was higher than the national mean
of 22 [31]. Median (range) practice characteristics were
as follows: practice list size 6514 (1055–21,374) pa-
tients; number of GPs four (0–12); number of GP part-
ners three (0–8); number of salaried GPs one (0–13);
number of ‘first fives’ one (0–6). Twenty-three prac-
tices had teaching status. The number of practices par-
ticipating in the local scheme increased over time, with
almost all practices contributing to all indicators by
the final year (Table 1).
The local incentive scheme
Sixteen indicators addressing local clinical and public
health priorities were developed, covering five health pri-
orities: weight management; alcohol consumption; learn-
ing disabilities; osteoporosis; and chlamydia screening
Table 1 Number of practices participating in Local QOF by indicator and year
Clinical and public Health Priority Indicator 2007–08 2008–09 2009-10 2010–11
Weight management BMI register >25 recorded within 5 years 79 80 80 –
BMI register >25 recorded last 15 months 79 80 80 –
BMI >25 intervention last 15 months 79 80 80 –
Alcohol Register number of units last 27 months 79 80 80 83
Females >14 units and males >21 units offered brief intervention 79 79 80 83
Learning disabilities Register over 18 years with a learning disability 77 80 80 83
Those on register with a review recorded in the preceding
15 months.
77 80 80 83
Osteoporosis Register of females aged 65–74 with a fracture last 15 months 80 80 80 83
Proportion of register referred for a DEXA scan 80 80 80 83
Register aged >16 years who have at least one repeat
prescription for oral prednisolone in last 6 months
75 76 80 83
Percentage on prednisolone register DEXA scan or referral in last
15 months
75 76 80 83
Percentage over 65 years prescribed prednisolone in the last
6 months, DEXA scan or referral in last 15 months, or assessed
for osteoporosis risk.
75 76 80 83
Register over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae,
hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday
– – 80 83
Percentage over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae,
hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday, assessed and
treated for Osteoporosis risk ever.
– – 80 83
Chlamydia screening Register aged 15 to 24. 42 79 80 –
Proportion between 15–24 years offered screening and have a
recorded result
42 79 80 82
Blank cells indicate where the indicator was not yet introduced or had been withdrawn from the scheme
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PCT and local health care professionals and approved by
the Local Medical Committee, which represents general
practitioners (GPs). Points were awarded on threshold
for weight management, alcohol, and osteoporosis indi-
cators (practices were required to achieve the minimum
target threshold to score any points, with increasing
points awarded for achieving mid and maximum thresh-
olds (Table 2). Each point earned the practice £124.60 in
the first year (2007–2008), adjusted for the size of the
practice population. Payments for achieving learning dis-
ability and chlamydia indicators were awarded on a per
patient basis (£50 per patient). Payments, indicators and
thresholds were reviewed and refined over the lifetime
of the scheme. The PCT provided practices with stan-
dardised computerised templates, embedded within elec-
tronic patient records, to facilitate recording for both
clinical care and indicator production.
Data collection and analysis
We invited all 83 primary care practices to opt out of the
evaluation if they objected to our analysis of practice-
anonymised data. Indicator data were included from
April 2007 through March 2011. Registered populationsocioeconomic deprivation data were extracted from
PCT practice profiles, the General Medical Services
dataset and the Prescription Pricing Division of the
Business Services Authority. Practices were scored
using the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) calcu-
lated by the PCT averaging over all patient postcodes
registered with the practice (PIMD). IMD measures
deprivation across seven domains: income, employ-
ment, education, health and disability, crime, barriers
to housing and services, and living environment [31].
Deprivation was treated as a continuous variable. Practices
in more or less deprived areas were categorised as above
or below the median.
A longitudinal analysis adopting a hierarchical multi-
level model was undertaken, as performance measures
were regarded as nested within practices each year.
This enabled use of all the observations in each year,
avoided errors of reduced confidence intervals for esti-
mated coefficients, and allowed a comparison of vari-
ation between practices and over time. Performance
against each indicator was measured as percentage
achievement and treated as a continuous measure to
describe the proportion of patients achieving a given
clinical indicator. We modelled all percentage achievements
Table 2 Clinical indicators and payment thresholds
Trends in practice achievement (%) Thresholds
Clinical area Indicator
type
Description Points
(£124.60/point)
Min Mid Max
Weight
management
Register OB1 Production of a register of patients aged 16–75 with a BMI ≥25 recorded in the last 5 years 3 No register
THEN 0 points
n/a Have register
THEN 3 points
Omitted 2010-11
Register OB2 Production of a register of patients aged 6–75 with a BMI ≥25 recorded in the last 15 months 7 No registered
THEN 0 points
n/a Have register
THEN 7 points
Omitted 2010-11
Process OB3 Proportion of patients with a BMI ≥25 receiving appropriate intervention in the past 15 months 20 > = 15 % THEN
6 points
> = 30 % THEN
12 points
> = 50 % THEN
20 points
Omitted 2010-11
Alcohol Register A1 Production of a register of patients aged 16 years and over with a record of the number of units of
alcohol consumed on a weekly basis in the past 27 months
10 No register
THEN 0 points
n/a Have register
THEN 10
points
Process A2 Percentage of patients aged 16 and over who drink >14 units a week (3 units a day) for females and
21 units a week (4 units a day) for males who have been offered a brief intervention
10 IF > = 30 %
THEN 3 points
> = 40 % THEN
6 points
> = 50 % THEN
10 points
Learning
disabilities
Register LD1 The practice can produce a register of people over 18 years with a learning disability £50 per
registered
patient
Process LD2 Patients over 18 years with LD with a review recorded in the preceding 15 months. Checks include
accuracy of prescribed medication, physical health and co-ordination with secondary care
£50 per health
check
Osteoporosis Register OST1 Production of a register of female patients aged 65–74 with a fracture in the previous 15 months 2 No register
THEN 0 points
n/a Have register
THEN 2 points
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Process OST 2 Proportion of female patients 65–74 that have had a fracture who have been referred for a dual
energy X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) scan
4 > = 15 % THEN
1 points
> = 30 % THEN
2 points
> = 50 % THEN
4 points
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Register OST3 Production of a register of male and female patients aged 16 years and over who have received at
least one repeat prescription for oral prednisolone in the previous 6 months
2 Not register
THEN 0 points
n/a Have register
THEN 2 points
Wording modified in 2009–10 and 2010-2011
Process OST4 Percentage of patients on register (OST 3) who have a record of a DEXA scan at any time or a
referral for a DEXA scan in the previous 15 months
5 > = 15 % THEN
1 points
> = 30 % THEN
3 points
> = 50 % THEN
5 points
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Process OST5 Percentage of patients aged 65 years and over who have had one or more repeat prescriptions of
prednisolone in the last 6 months, who also have a record of a DEXA scan at any time, or a referral for a
DEXA scan in the previous 15 months, or have been assessed for osteoporosis risk
5 > = 15 % THEN
1 points
> = 30 % THEN
3 points
> = 50 % THEN
5 points
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Register OST6 The practice can produce a register of male and female patients aged 75 years and over who
have had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday
2 Not Registered
THEN 0 points
n/a Have
Registered
THEN 2 points
Introduced 2009–10
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Table 2 Clinical indicators and payment thresholds (Continued)
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Process OST7 Percentage of male and female patients aged 75 years and over who have had a fragility fracture
of the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday, who have been assessed and treated
for Osteoporosis risk ever.
5 > = 15 % THEN
1 points
> = 30 % THEN
3 points
> = 50 % THEN
5 points
Introduced 2009–10
Wording modified in 2010-2011
Chlamydia
Screening
Register C1 The practice can produce a register of patients aged 15 to 24 of both sexes 2 Not Registered
THEN 0 points
n/a Have
Registered
THEN 2 pointsOmitted 2010-11
Process C2 Proportion of patients between 15–24 years old who have been offered screening by their practice
and have a recorded test result
£5 per
screened
patient
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log(Performance/(100-Performance)) to stabilise the vari-
ance and improve the validity of the model. Results are
presented as regression coefficients. The intra-class correl-
ation coefficient for each indicator fit is provided; lower
values show that performance is inconsistent over time.
Statistically significant values are expressed as odds ratios.
Points assigned for each indicator were available but were
not used as any analysis would have had reduced power
due to the discretisation of the outcome, and the distribu-
tion of the outcome would have been more challenging to
model successfully.
Practices’ total financial income was calculated for each
year. We derived the income per patient for each of the
four financial years by dividing by reported list size. The
local incentive payments might be regarded as a weighted
basket of indicators where the weights emphasise the
importance to the funder. Division by the list size stan-
dardised the outcome to a rate per patient registered at
each practice. Income as an outcome was modelled
using a multilevel regression.
We included the following factors and covariates in the
fitted models: financial year; IMD (as a linear term and also
as a cubic spline); and modification of IMD by time (i.e. an
interaction between IMD and year). List size and total num-
ber of GPs were excluded as they were strongly correlated
with practice IMD which was the focus of this evaluation.
For practice income a full model was initially fitted and
stepping down was implemented. We included the follow-
ing factors and covariates in the fitted models: list size (as
a linear term and also as a cubic spline); financial year;
total number of GPs, number of partners, number of sal-
aried GPs; number of ‘first fives’ (i.e. recently qualified
GPs); practice teaching status (i.e. whether involved in
training of GPs) and IMD (as a linear term and also as a
cubic spline); and modification of IMD by time (i.e. an
interaction between IMD and year). List size was included
as learning disability and chlamydia screening indicators
were proportional to list size and activity level. Covariates
or factors were dropped if the effect size was small and
statistical significance did not reach the 10 % significance
level. We aimed to achieve sufficiently parsimonious
models for which coefficients could be estimated effi-
ciently. All analysis was undertaken using the R statistical
package version 2.12.0 [32] and the nlme package version
3.1 [33]. The statistical interaction term was included to
assess the impact of the local incentive on health inequal-
ities and estimate if any gap has widened or narrowed
through the duration of the scheme.
Ethical review
The study was approved by National Research Ethics
Service East Midlands- Nottingham 2 Committee (11/
EM/0184).Results
Analysis of achievement
Table 3 shows levels of population coverage achieved
for each indicator. Against backgrounds of overall in-
creasing achievement, there was still substantial scope
for improvement towards the end of the scheme. For
example, just over a quarter (26.1 %) of the population
had a recorded BMI within the preceding 15 months
by 2009–10 whilst only 6.1 % of patients aged 15–24
years had recorded chlamydia screening test results by
2010–11.
Table 4 provides the coefficients in the regression for
each indicator. In Table 5 we present statistically signifi-
cant effects as odds ratios. We found that higher prac-
tice deprivation was associated with poorer achievement
for five indicators over a four-year incentivised period:
alcohol use registration (OR 0.97; 95 % confidence inter-
val 0.96,0.99; p = 0.006); recorded chlamydia test result
(OR 0.97; 0.94,0.99; p = 0.002); osteoporosis registration
(OR 0.98; 0.97,0.99; p = 0.010); registration of repeat
prednisolone prescription (OR 0.98; 0.96,0.99; p = 0.001);
and prednisolone registration with record of dual energy
X-ray absorptiometry (DEXA) scan or referral (OR 0.92;
0.86,0.97; p = 0.003). Higher practice deprivation was
associated with better achievement for one indicator,
registration of osteoporotic fragility fracture (OR 1.26;
1.04,1.51; p = 0.016). The deprivation-achievement gap
widened over the four years of the scheme for one indica-
tor, registered females aged 65–74 with a fracture referred
for a DEXA scan (OR 0.97; 0.95,0.99; p = 0.028). Two
other indicators that were introduced in the last two years
of the scheme followed a similar trend: registration of
fragility fracture (OR 0.88; 0.82, 0.94; p = 0.001); and
over-75’s with a fragility fracture assessed and treated
for osteoporosis risk (OR 0.92; 0.87, 0.97; p = 0.003).
For one indicator, registration of repeat prednisolone
prescription, the deprivation-achievement gap closed
over time (OR 1.01; 1.01, 1.01; p = 0.001).
Income analysis
Fig. 1 shows the distribution of total practice income for
practices in more and less deprived areas by year. The
total funding available also reflected the trajectory for
the median values, with twice as much funding available
in the two middle years.
Hierarchical multiple regression indicated that income
over time was positively correlated with practice size
(coefficient 0.0000161; t = 2.27; p = 0.026) and negatively
correlated with IMD (coefficient −0.00664; t = −3.99;
p = 0.0001; Table 6). For convenience of interpretation,
we report size and practice IMD ‘centred’ around the
average median values. No intercept was fitted so that
the coefficients for each financial year represent the
average payment per patient for that year.
Table 3 Achievement on clinical process and outcome indicators over timea
Clinical Area Indicator Achievement Year 1
2007-08
Year 2
2008-09
Year 3
2009-10
Year 4
2010-11
Weight management BMI register >25 recorded within 5 years Mean percentage achievement (SD) 32.7 (7.7) 36.4 (7.4) 38.7 (9.5) NA
Mean practices in more deprived areas 31.2 (8.2) 34.9 (7.6) 36.7 (11.2) (−)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 34.2 (7.0) 38.0 (6.9) 40.7 (7.0) (−)
BMI register >25 recorded last 15 months Mean percentage achievement (SD) 19.9 (6.1) 24.5 (6.7) 26.1 (8.0) NA
Mean practices in more deprived areas 19.4 (6.0) 23.6 (6.8) 26.1 (9.4) (−)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 20.5 (6.1) 25.4 (6.5) 26.1 (6.5) (−)
BMI >25 intervention last 15 months Mean percentage achievement (SD) 21.1 (17.8) 61.1 (23.4) 57.4 (18.8) NA
Mean practices in more deprived areas 17.0 (15.2) 59.7 (23.6) 54.5 (21.1) (−)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 25.3 (19.4) 62.6 (23.5) 60.2 (16.0) (−)
Alcohol Register number of units last 27 months Mean percentage achievement (SD) 19.5 (14.8) 32.1 (17.2) 44.4 (20.9) 54.8 (20.4)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 13.1 (10.8) 23.8 (15.8) 39.4 (24.9) 54.9 (23.5)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 26.1 (15.6) 40.4 (14.5) 49.5 (14.5) 54.7 (16.6)
Females >14 units and males >21 units offered brief intervention Mean percentage achievement (SD) 33.9 (28.5) 69.9 (23.4) 74.7 (24.2) 74.8 (20.7)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 26.4 (26.6) 70.6 (26.2) 71.8 (29.7) 71.0 (23.3)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 41.7 (28.6) 69.2 (20.4) 77.5 (17.0) 79.0 (16.8)
Learning disabilities Register over 18 years with a learning disability Mean percentage achievement (SD) .3 (.2) .4 (.3) .4 (.2) .5 (.3)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 0.28 (0.21) 0.33 (0.26) 0.34 (0.26) 0.51 (0.29)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 0.29 (0.23) 0.40 (0.24) 0.40 (0.23) 0.50 (0.27)
Those on register with a review recorded in the preceding 15 months. Mean percentage achievement (SD) .9 (7.0) 54.2 (37.1) 59.2 (34.0) 58.8 (33.5)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 0.2 (1.2) 48.6 (38.4) 49.4 (37.9) 52.7 (36.7)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 1.6 (9.7) 59.7 (35.3) 69.0 (26.5) 65.4 (28.5)
Osteoporosis Register of females aged 65–74 with a fracture last 15 months Mean percentage achievement (SD) .6 (.8) 1.0 (1.0) 1.3 (1.1) .6 (.5)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 0.57 (0.89) 0.80 (1.14) 1.19 (1.44) 0.45 (0.52)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 0.66 (0.60) 1.17 (0.91) 1.48 (0.73) 0.72 (0.40)
Proportion of register referred for a DEXA scan Mean percentage achievement (SD) 1.1 (6.3) 46.1 (45.1) 51.1 (42.4) 42.0 (39.2)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 1.3 (7.9) 32.0 (45.5) 39.0 (46.2) 29.0 (40.4)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 0.9 (4.2) 60.1 (40.7) 63.3 (34.7) 57.8 (32.2)
Register aged >16 years who have at least one repeat prescription for oral
prednisolone in last 6 months
Mean percentage achievement (SD) .9 (1.3) .4 (.5) .2 (.2) .3 (1.1)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 0.31 (0.32) 0.29 (0.34) 0.21 (0.19) 0.23 (0.26)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 0.90 (1.72) 0.54 (0.57) 0.22 (0.15) 0.45 (1.55)
Percentage on prednisolone register DEXA scan or referral in last 15 months Mean percentage achievement (SD) 16.6 (25.9) 65.0 (39.1) 58.0 (38.5) 66.3 (36.6)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 8.4 (17.3) 58.0 (40.8) 46.1 (41.3) 51.3 (42.0)
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Table 3 Achievement on clinical process and outcome indicators over timea (Continued)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 24.2 (30.2) 71.3 (37.0) 69.9 (31.8) 82.5 (20.0)
Percentage over 65 years prescribed prednisolone in the last 6 months, DEXA
scan or referral in last 15 months, or assessed for osteoporosis risk.
Mean percentage achievement (SD) 31.0 (34.4) 66.1 (39.4) 60.6 (41.4) 1.8 (3.2)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 31.4 (38.7) 56.3 (45.5) 49.6 (47.3) 1.1 (1.4)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 30.6 (30.3) 74.9 (30.9) 71.6 (31.3) 2.5 (4.3)
Register over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or
humerus since their 75th Birthday
Mean percentage achievement (SD) NA NA 1.1 (.9) 60.7 (43.5)
Mean practices in more deprived areas – (−) – (−) 0.7 (0.7) 36.5 (45.3)
Mean practices in less deprived areas – (−) – (−) 1.4 (0.9) 86.6 (20.6)
Percentage over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist,
or humerus since their 75th Birthday, assessed and treated for Osteoporosis
risk ever.
Mean percentage achievement (SD) NA NA 4.7 (2.8) 56.3 (39.5)
Mean practices in more deprived areas – (−) – (−) 3.4 (2.7) 36.8 (41.0)
Mean practices in less deprived areas – (−) – (−) 6.2 (2.0) 77.2 (24.7)
Chlamydia Screening Register aged 15 to 24. Mean percentage achievement (SD) 100 (0) 100 (0) 100 (0) NA
Mean practices in more deprived areas 100 (0) 100 (0) 100 (0) (−)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 100 (0) 100 (0) 100 (0) (−)
Proportion between 15–24 years offered screening and have a recorded
result
Mean percentage achievement (SD) 1.7 (1.7) 5.7 (4.9) 6.1 (4.9) 6.1 (7.5)
Mean practices in more deprived areas 1.53 (1.43) 4.45 (4.80) 6.10 (5.03) 6.61 (9.78)
Mean practices in less deprived areas 1.72 (1.87) 6.98 (4.67) 7.16 (4.43) 5.63 (3.77)
aBlank cells indicate where the indicator was not yet introduced or had been withdrawn from the scheme
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Table 4 Performance on clinical indicators over 2007–11a
Clinical and
public Health
Priority
Indicator 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009-2010 2010–2011 PIMD PIMD*Year ICC
Weight
management
BMI register >25 recorded within 5 years −0.74 (−1.11,-0.38) −0.57 (−0.93,-0.20) −0.58 (−0.94,-0.22) – −0.000 (−0.009,0.009) −0.005 (−0.011,0.000) 0.35
BMI register >25 recorded last 15 months −1.51 (−1.86,-1.15) −1.23 (−1.59,-0.88) −1.26 (−1.61,-0.90) – 0.002 (−0.007,0.011) −0.004 (−0.009,0.001) 0.41
BMI >25 intervention last 15 months −1.32 (−2.06,-0.58) 1.10 (0.36,1.83) 0.50 (−0.23,1.22) – −0.008 (−0.026,0.010) −0.004 (−0.018,0.010) 0.04
Alcohol Register number of units last 27 months −0.87 (−1.48,-0.25) 0.02 (−0.59,0.64) 0.54 (−0.08,1.16) 1.16 (0.55,3.20) −0.027 (−0.042,-0.011) 0.006 (−0.000,0.012) 0.38
Females >14 units and males >21 units offered
brief intervention
−0.71 (−1.92,0.51) 2.06 (0.85,3.28) 2.09 (0.88,3.30) 2.37 (1.16,3.58) −0.019 (−0.048,0.011) 0.008 (−0.006,0.022) 0.13
Learning
disabilities
Register over 18 years with a learning disability −6.05 (−6.41,-5.69) −5.80 (−6.16,-5.44) −5.75 (−5.78,-5.39) −5.42 (−5.78,-5.06) −0.001 (−0.010,0.008) 0.002 (−0.000,0.003) 0.80
Those on register with a review recorded in
the preceding 15 months.
−5.64 (−7.35,-3.94) 0.84 (−0.87,2.54) 1.42 (−0.29,3.13) 1.54 (−0.16,3.25) −0.033 (−0.075,0.010) −0.008 (−0.025,0.009) 0.33
Osteoporosis Register of females aged 65–74 with a fracture
last 15 months
−4.96 (−5.53,-4.39) −4.54 (−5.11,-3.97) −4.16 (−4.73,-3.59) −4.78 (−5.34,-4.21) −0.019 (−0.033,-0.004) −0.004 (−0.010,0.003) 0.20
Proportion of register referred for a DEXA scan −5.14 (−7.50,-2.78) 0.74 (−1.62,3.10) 1.42 (−0.94,3.78) 0.43 (−1.92,2.79) −0.043 (−0.102,0.015) −0.030 (−0.056,-0.003) 0.21
Register aged >16 years who have at least one
repeat prescription for oral prednisolone in last
6 months
−4.80 (−5.16,-4.44) −4.97 (−5.33,-4.60) −5.45 (−5.81,-5.08) −5.35 (−5.72,-4.99) −0.023 (−0.032,-0.014) 0.007 (0.004,0.010) 0.59
Percentage on prednisolone register DEXA
scan or referral in last 15 months
−1.10 (−3.40,1.19) 4.66 (2.36,6.97) 4.09 (1.77,6.41) 4.85 (2.54,7.17) −0.089 (−0.147,-0.030) −0.002 (−0.026,0.022) 0.33
Percentage over 65 years prescribed
prednisolone in the last 6 months, DEXA scan
or referral in last 15 months, or assessed for
osteoporosis risk.
−0.51 (−2.69,1.67) 2.99 (0.81,5.18) 2.73 (0.53,4.93) −2.95 (−5.14,-0.75) −0.047 (−0.102,0.009) −0.008 (−0.031,0.014) 0.32
Register over 75 years had a fragility fracture of
the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus since their
75th Birthday
– – −13.27 (−20.11,-6.43) −7.39 (−14.24,-0.55) 0.228 (0.042,1.256) −0.131 (−0.203,-0.059) 0.08
Percentage over 75 years had a fragility
fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist, or humerus
since their 75th Birthday, assessed and treated
for Osteoporosis risk ever.
– – −8.01 (−13.14,-2.87) −4.53 (−9.67,0.60) 0.124 (−0.014,0.262) −0.082 (−0.136,-0.028) 0.22
Chlamydia
screening
Register aged 15 to 24. All participating practices record 100 % for 07–08, 08–09, and 09–10.
Proportion between 15–24 years offered
screening and have a recorded result
−4.00 (−4.80,-3.21) −2.15 (−2.98,-1.33) −2.11 (−2.93,-1.29) −2.28 (−3.10,-1.46) −0.033 (−0.054,-0.012) 0.002 (−0.004,0.008) 0.69
aBlank cells indicate where the indicator was not yet introduced or had been withdrawn from the scheme
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Table 5 Multilevel modelling accounting for clustering of years within practicesa
Clinical area Description OR Practice IMD
per deprivation
point
P OR Practice IMD per
deprivation point per
year
P
Weight
management
BMI register >25 recorded within 5 years
BMI register >25 recorded last 15 months
BMI >25 intervention last 15 months
Alcohol Register number of units last 27 months 0.974 (0.959,0.989) 0.006
Females >14 units and males >21 units offered brief intervention
Learning
disabilities
Register over 18 years with a learning disability
Those on register with a review recorded in the preceding 15 months.
Osteoporosis Register of females aged 65–74 with a fracture last 15 months 0.982 (0.968,0.996) 0.010
Proportion of register referred for a DEXA scan 0.971 (0.946,0.997) 0.028
Register aged >16 years who have at least one repeat prescription for
oral prednisolone in last 6 months
0.977 (0.969,0.986) 0.001 1.007 (1.004,1.010) 0.001
Percentage on prednisolone register DEXA scan or referral in last
15 months
0.915 (0.864,0.970) 0.003
Percentage over 65 years prescribed prednisolone in the last 6 months,
DEXA scan or referral in last 15 months, or assessed for osteoporosis risk.
Register over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip, wrist,
or humerus since their 75th Birthday
1.256 (1.043,1.511) 0.016 0.877 (0.816,0.943) 0.001
Percentage over 75 years had a fragility fracture of the vertebrae, hip,
wrist, or humerus since their 75th Birthday, assessed and treated for
Osteoporosis risk ever.
0.921 (0.873,0.972) 0.003
Chlamydia
Screening
Register aged 15–24.
Proportion between 15–24 years offered screening and have a recorded
result
0.967 (0.947,0.988) 0.002
aOnly statistically significant odds ratios are presented
Fig. 1 Boxplot of distribution of annual practice income for practices in more and less deprived areas by financial year
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Table 6 Regression of practice income levels
Factor Coefficient SE DF t-value p-value
2007–08 0.697 0.035 237
2008–09 1.466 0.035 237
2009–10 1.488 0.035 237
20019–11 0.762 0.035 237
List-size-6643 0.000016 0.000008 81 2.27 0.0257
IMD-36 −0.00664 0.00166 81 −3.99 0.0001
Note: The model was fitted to 323 income values grouped within 83 practices
Glidewell et al. BMC Family Practice  (2015) 16:61 Page 11 of 13Factors such as the number of GPs, partners, number
of ‘first fives,’ and teaching practice status appeared well
represented in the model by list size. The association
with list size was well represented by a simple linear
term. The coefficient reported is per patient. Thus an in-
crease in list size by 6000 patients is associated with an
additional £0.10 per patient. There was an association
with deprivation as measured by the average practice
IMD (PIMD) score for a practice. An increase in PIMD
by 15 points (one standard deviation) was associated
with a reduction in payment of £0.10 per patient; prac-
tices serving more deprived populations receive rela-
tively lower payments. A modification to the deprivation
term was considered, but found to be very small and far
from statistical significance. In consequence, the model
predicted neither widening nor narrowing of inequality
in practice income.
Larger practices and those serving more affluent areas
earned more income per patient than smaller practices
and those serving more deprived areas (t −3.99 p = 0.0001).
A practice of average list size (6719 patients) and average
deprivation (PIMD = 36.51) would earn around £7500
per year; a practice with 3598 more patients (one
standard deviation in list size) would earn £11,962
(£4462 more). A practice with an additional deprivation
of one standard deviation 15.34) would earn £7081
(£419 less).
Discussion
We found that practice level deprivation was associated
with lower achievement for five out of 16 indicators
in a local primary care pay-for-performance scheme.
Deprivation-achievement gaps closed over time for one
indicator but opened up for three others. Overall, the
observed differences were modest. Almost all of the in-
dicators we analysed involved cumulative registration
of at-risk patient populations, so that we would have
expected gaps to close over time once ‘ceilings’ in
achievement had been reached. For the most part, this
did not occur. We also found that considerable scope
for improvement still existed by the end of the scheme.
For example, the final mean proportions of targeted pa-
tients with recorded alcohol use and offers of screeningand recording of chlamydia test results were 55 and
6.2 % respectively. This is the first inequalities analysis
of a local pay-for-performance scheme; our findings on
achievement contrast with those of the national scheme
[24]. We also found inequalities in income with smaller
practices serving more deprived populations earning
less than larger practices serving more affluent popula-
tions. This is in line with analyses for the national
scheme that found an inconsistent link between work-
load and reward for practices in deprived areas, sug-
gesting that smaller practices serving more deprived
populations had to work harder to earn the same
amount per patient [20]. Our accompanying qualitative
study suggested that financial reward was the main ex-
trinsic driver for smaller practices serving more de-
prived populations. However there were concerns that
financial rewards from the local scheme may not have
been worth the effort involved in achieving targets. The
national scheme was perceived as more important as
there was more remuneration attached [28].
There were four main study limitations. First, we only
examined one local pay-for-performance scheme in a
relatively deprived population; we cannot assume that
our findings would be generalizable elsewhere or to
schemes with different indicators and targets. Second,
as with the national Quality and Outcomes Framework,
the content of indicators and the thresholds for levels
of achievement both changed year upon year and some
were withdrawn. Although this is challenging for re-
searchers and complicates the interpretation of trends,
our evaluation subsequently reflected ‘real world’ cir-
cumstances. Outcomes were not standardised by the
number of patients with each condition as many of the
targets involved establishing a register. List size (strongly
correlated with practice deprivation) and ratio of GPs to
patients were not included as covariates (no data on num-
ber of sessions worked). Third, as Alshamsan et al. noted
for similar analyses, the absence of any pre-intervention
data means that we cannot attribute any reductions in
inequalities to the scheme [24]. Fourth, deprivation
was summarised at the level of lowest super-output
areas, which may contain areas with different levels of
deprivation. In addition, deprivation scores were
assigned on the basis of averaging over the patient list
postcodes, potentially resulting in an underestimation
of the association between patient-level socioeconomic
deprivation and achievement.
Although all practices had signed up to the scheme by
its final year, the overall levels of achieved population
coverage were limited; practices may have reduced effort
once the relatively modest targets had been met. Our ac-
companying qualitative evaluation suggested no particu-
larly strong sense of local ownership of the scheme, or
its public health-oriented indicators, which could have
Glidewell et al. BMC Family Practice  (2015) 16:61 Page 12 of 13motivated stronger efforts compared with the national
scheme [28]. The national QOF scheme is worth around
£130,000 in total per annum to the average practice
whereas the local scheme is worth £7500, translating
into around £970 and £470 per indicator respectively
[34]. The income per point was similar in both schemes
but practices may have focused more attention on the
larger overall income available from the national QOF.
Larger practices serving more affluent populations are
often better positioned, in terms of having greater cap-
acity to scale up and industrialise activity, for better and
earlier achievement than their counterparts. Whilst there
would be risks in being seen to penalise the former, local
policy-makers need to generate a consensus on ‘fairness’
and the need for quality improvement initiatives that
proportionately compensate practices serving more de-
prived patient populations.
With continuing reforms in English primary care at least
rhetorically geared towards promoting local autonomy
[25–27], the number and range of local incentivised
schemes are likely to grow. Given the cost of implementing
local schemes there is an urgent need for further evalua-
tions of both effectiveness and equity which improve upon
our own, which was limited by the lack of pre-intervention
data and relatively small number of indicators.
Conclusion
Practice level deprivation was associated with modestly
lower achievement for around a third of 16 indicators in a
local primary care pay-for-performance scheme. There
was relatively little change over time, with deprivation-
achievement gaps closing for one indicator but opening
up for three others. Furthermore, given that inequalities in
financial reward may not reflect the amount of work
undertaken by smaller practices serving more deprived pa-
tients given the fixed costs of setting up and managing dis-
ease registers, future iterations and evaluations of local
pay-for-performance schemes need to address fairness of
rewards according to effort as well as effectiveness.
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